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1. Natural Compatibilism vs. Natural Incompatibilism 
According to proponents of natural incompatibilism, most people judge that determinism1 
threatens our traditional picture of human agency (see, e.g., Cover & O’Leary-Hawthorne, 1996; 
Ekstrom, 2000; Kane, 1999; Nichols, 2015; O’Connor, 2000; Pereboom, 2001; Searle, 1984; 
Smilansky, 2003; Strawson, 1986). According to proponents of natural compatibilism, most 
people intuitively believe that free will and/or moral responsibility are compatible with 
determinism (see, e.g., Ayer, 1954; Dennett, 1984; Fischer & Ravizza, 1998; Lycan, 2003; 
Nahmias, 2014; Nowell-Smith, 1949; Stace, 1952; Wolf, 1990). Given the ubiquity of these 
competing appeals to common sense in the free will literature, it is important to determine which 
is right. But until experimental philosophers started exploring the relevant folk intuitions in a 
controlled and systematic way, there was a dearth of evidence concerning which view has 
empirical support.  
In some of the earliest work on this front, Nahmias, Morris, Nadelhoffer, and Turner 
(2005; 2006) used three different descriptions of determinism and found that a significant 
 
1 Determinism is the view that every event (X) is necessitated by past events (P) together with the laws of nature (L). 
More formally, it has the following form: Necessarily (if PL, then X). If determinism is true, then at any moment, 
given the past and the laws, there is one and only one possible outcome. Indeterminism is just the denial of 
determinism. If indeterminism is true, at any given moment, more than one outcome is possible even if you keep 
the past and the laws fixed. 
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majority of participants (typically 65%-85%) judged that agents in deterministic scenarios act of 
their own free will and are morally responsible. Consider, for instance, their supercomputer 
scenario, whereby a supercomputer can predict the future with 100% accuracy based on 
deductions from the “laws of nature and the current state of everything in the world” (Nahmias 
et al., 2005, 559).2 Despite the fact that determinism was stipulated in the scenario, 76% of 
participants judged that Jeremy robbed the bank of his own free will and 83% judged that he was 
morally responsible. These findings were consistent across cases involving neutral actions (e.g., 
going jogging), positively valenced actions (e.g., saving a child from a burning building), and 
negatively valenced actions (e.g., robbing a bank). Nahmias and colleagues also replicated these 
effects in two additional studies utilizing further deterministic scenarios and concluded that the 
case for natural compatibilism was strong (2006). 
Nichols and Knobe (2007) ran some follow-up studies to explore the psychological 
mechanisms that generate intuitions about moral responsibility.3 Participants were randomly 
assigned to either an abstract condition that describes both a deterministic Universe (A) and an 
indeterministic Universe (B) or a concrete condition that describes these two universes but also 
describes a person in Universe A, Bill, who murders his wife and family to be with his secretary. 
Participants were first asked which one of these two universes was more like their own. Nearly 
all participants (90%) answered ‘Universe B’. Then, participants in the abstract condition were 
asked whether it was possible for a person in Universe A to be “fully responsible for their actions.” 
 
2 For complete details concerning this scenario, see §2.  
3 By focusing narrowly on moral responsibility, Nichols and Knobe (2007) couldn’t speak directly to people’s free will 
beliefs. While it is intuitive that people’s beliefs about free will and moral responsibility should roughly track one 
another, there is some recent evidence that the two can come apart—e.g., Fidgor and Phelan (2015). 
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Participants in the Concrete Condition were asked “Is Bill fully morally responsible for killing his 
wife and children?” Whereas 72% of participants gave the compatibilist response that Bill is fully 
morally responsible in Universe A in the concrete condition, in the abstract condition 84% gave 
the incompatibilist response that it is not possible for people in Universe A to be fully morally 
responsible. These findings appear to challenge the claim that people’s intuitions are robustly 
compatibilist. Instead, whether people are inclined to give compatibilist answers may depend 
less on the presence (or absence) of determinism and more on the moral features of the vignettes 
and questions. Whereas people tend to display compatibilist leanings when asked to make 
judgments concerning the responsibility of specific agents, when they are asked instead to think 
about responsibility in the abstract, their intuitions trend towards incompatibilism.  
Debate about whether natural compatibilism or natural incompatibilism is best supported 
by the extant findings continues (see Bear & Knobe, 2016; Bourgeois-Gironde, Cova, Bertoux, & 
Dubois, 2012; Cova & Kitano, 2014; Deery, Davis, & Carey, 2014; Feltz, Cokely, & Nadelhoffer, 
2009; Feltz & Milan, 2013; Mandelbaum & Ripley, 2012; May, 2014; Murray & Nahmias, 2014; 
Nadelhoffer et al., 2014; Nadelhoffer, Murray, & Murray, 2019; Nadelhoffer, Yin, & Graves, 2019; 
Nahmias, 2006; 2011; Nahmias, Coates, & Kvaran, 2007; Nahmias & Murray, 2011; Nichols, 
2006a; Rose, Buckwalter, & Nichols, 2017; Rose & Nichols, 2013; Sinnott-Armstrong, 2008; Turri, 
2017a; 2017b; Woolfolk, Doris, & Darley, 2006). Most of the research that has explored this issue 
has utilized vignette-based designs whereby participants are presented with deterministic 
scenarios and then asked whether the agents in the scenarios are free and responsible.  
But in order for the results to provide support for natural compatibilism, it is imperative 
that participants have adequately understood and held fixed the determinism that is built into 
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the scenarios. After all, a compatibilist is someone who thinks that we can be free and responsible 
even if determinism is true. The “even if” part  requires that participants adequately understand 
the implications of determinism. Thus, from the standpoint of experimental design, putting 
natural compatibilism to the test requires that researchers ensure that participants’ intuitions 
are sufficiently responsive to the deterministic nature of the scenarios.4  
Let’s call this the tracking problem. There are at least three ways participants could fail to 
adequately track determinism. First, they could fail to understand or comprehend the 
determinism altogether—e.g., they could incorrectly identify the scenario as indeterministic. 
Second, they could correctly identify the scenario as deterministic but fail to comprehend the 
implications of determinism. Third, they could comprehend the determinism and its implications 
but fail to hold this fixed in their mind while thinking about the scenario and the follow up 
questions. In each of these cases, this would represent a failure to do what the experimenter 
asked—namely, make judgments about agency and responsibility in the face of determinism. 
There are multiple reasons why someone might fail to track determinism—motivated cognition, 
researcher effects from bad materials, or failure of acceptance, belief, imagination, inference, or 
reading comprehension. 
 The depth of the tracking problem was recently highlighted by Rose et al. (2017), who 
took as their starting point the evidence that most people do not believe that human actions are 
 
4 This is not to suggest that natural incompatibilists don’t have a similar burden. After all, they, too, have to ensure 
that people are not misunderstanding the deterministic features of the scenarios. The work on so-called “bypassing 
intuitions” suggests that it is possible for people who give seeming incompatibilist responses fail to understand the 
implications of determinism (Murray & Nahmias, 2014; Nahmias & Murray, 2011; cf. Chan, Deutsch, & Nichols, 2016; 
Rose & Nichols, 2013). Because our present focus is on the evidence that has been used to support natural 




deterministically caused (Monroe, Dillon, & Malle, 2014; Nichols, 2012; Nichols & Knobe, 2007; 
Rose & Nichols, 2013; Sarkissian et al., 2010; Stillman, Baumeister, & Mele, 2011). Given that folk 
metaphysics about human agency is largely indeterministic, Rose and colleagues suggested that 
this may interfere with people’s ability to understand and hold fixed the deterministic features 
of scenarios. After all, whenever one reads a fictional scenario, some details must be filled in by 
the reader. Might it be that people tend to fill in indeterministic details when it comes to 
deterministic scenarios? To shed light on this issue, Rose and colleagues drew the following 
distinction between importing and intruding: 
Importing occurs when participants fill in the scenario in ways that are consistent with the 
scenario, but the filling-in systematically goes beyond the information provided in the 
scenario. Of course, when participants read vignettes, importing will be a common 
occurrence. It becomes theoretically interesting when the imported information 
undermines the interpretation of the results. Intruding occurs when the filling in leads to 
a misrepresentation of the scenario (2017, 484). 
For present purposes, intrusion is the more germane phenomenon. For if people’s metaphysical 
indeterminism intrudes on how they think through deterministic scenarios, we won’t be able to 
read anything off about whether their intuitions provide support for natural compatibilism.  
So, in a series of studies, Rose and colleagues used the neuro-deterministic vignettes from 
Nahmias et al. (2014) with the addition of some more fine-grained comprehension questions 
designed specifically to detect the potential influence of intrusive metaphysics. They found 
indeterministic intrusion effects across six studies which suggests that many participants who 
appeared, on the surface, to give compatibilist answers were failing to adequately track the 
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determinism built into the scenarios. Rose and colleagues concluded that to the extent that 
natural compatibilists have failed to adequately address the tracking problem, they have failed 
to provide evidence for their preferred theory about the nature of ordinary intuitions about free 
will and responsibility.  
 In what follows, we extend the research by Rose et al. (2017) by revisiting two of the 
classic scenarios that have been used to support natural compatibilism—namely, the 
supercomputer and rollback scenarios from Nahmias et al. (2005; 2006). If it turns out that 
intrusion effects are prevalent when using these scenarios, this would potentially undercut two 
prominent findings for natural compatibilism. If participants are failing to track the deterministic 
features of these scenarios, then it cannot be inferred whether or not they find free will and 
responsibility to be compatible with determinism. Our prediction was that this is what we would 
find. This was borne out by our findings which show that indeterministic intrusion is common in 
people who judge that free will and responsibility are compatible with determinism in classic 
scenarios. As we will argue, this challenges some of the key evidence used to support natural 
compatibilism. 
2. Current Research 
The purpose of this research is to test for indeterministic intrusion effects while controlling for 
factors that have arisen in the literature on folk intuitions about free will and responsibility. First, 
given the influence of the work by Nahmias et al. (2005; 2006), we wanted to base our study on 
their aforementioned supercomputer and rollback scenarios. Second, we wanted to include 
scenarios involving negatively valenced actions as well as positively valenced actions since past 
research suggests that the effect created by negatively valenced actions may have an outsized 
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influence on people’s intuitions (Nichols & Knobe 2007). Third, and relatedly, we wanted to 
include both concrete and abstract scenarios since past research suggests that there is an 
asymmetry in how people respond to each type of case (Nichols & Knobe 2007; Roskies & Nichols 
2008). Finally, following Shepherd (2015) and Turri (2017c), we wanted to include scenarios 
involving agents as well as robots—predicting that the former scenarios would elicit more 
indeterministic intrusion because agents are usually deemed to be more indeterministic than 
robots, making the latter an illustrative contrast class.  
 Our primary prediction was that we would find intrusion effects across all conditions. We 
also predicted that the effects would be more pronounced in the agent conditions than in the 
robot conditions, which would suggest that the indeterminism at play is something focused more 
narrowly on human agency (rather than the structure of the universe more generally). We 
thought that if our findings supported these predictions, this would problematize the findings 
that have used to support natural compatibilism. For if the intrusion of an indeterministic 
metaphysics occurs when people think about human agency, then researchers must be careful 
to control for this tendency when studying free will judgments. 
3. Methods 
3.1. Participants  
To contribute to a better understanding of indeterministic intrusion effects, we ran a new study 
using a between-subject design. While we recruited 1,500 participants from Amazon Mechanical 
Turk (MTurk), only 1,384 completed the study. Participants had to satisfy three conditions in 
order to qualify to take our Mturk Human Intelligence Task (HIT): (a) they needed to have 
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successfully completed at least 500 HITS in the past, (b) they needed a HIT success completion 
rate of at least 97%, and (c) they needed to be located in the United States. On average, it took 
participants 15 minutes and 10 seconds to complete the study. They were paid $1 for 
participating. In addition to excluding participants who did not complete the study (n = 112), we 
also excluded participants who failed a comprehension check (n = 88).5 This left us with N = 1,296 
participants (Mage = 35.22 years, SD = 11.65, rangeage = [18 - 77], 48% females, 78% Caucasian). 
This study was approved by the Institutional Review Board of the College of Charleston. 
3.2. Materials and Design 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of twelve conditions. The factors that varied 
between cases included Scenario (Supercomputer, Rollback), Action (Good, Bad), Case Type 
(Abstract, Concrete), and Entity (Agent, Robot). Case Type wasn’t fully crossed due to the fact 
that the abstract versions don’t specify any particular actions undertaken in that universe. We 
thus begin by presenting the cases for the concrete variations and then the cases for the abstract 
variants. 
Beginning with the concrete versions, here is the Bad Action version of the 
Supercomputer case, featuring an agent: 
Supercomputer: Imagine that in the next century we discover all the laws of nature, and 
we build a supercomputer which can deduce from these laws of nature and from the 
current state of everything in the world exactly what will be happening in the world at 
any future time. It can look at everything about the way the world is and predict 
 
5 We say more about the comprehension question we used and why we used it in §3.2. 
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everything about how it will be with 100% accuracy. Suppose that such a supercomputer 
existed, and it looks at the state of the universe at a certain time on March 25th, 2150 
A.D., twenty years before Jeremy Hall is born. The computer then deduces from this 
information and the laws of nature that Jeremy will definitely rob Fidelity Bank at 6:00 
PM on January 26th, 2195. As always, the supercomputer’s prediction is correct; Jeremy 
robs Fidelity Bank at 6:00 PM on January 26th, 2195.6 
In the Good Action version, robbing was replaced with saving a child from a burning building. And 
to vary the Entity involved in the case, Jeremy was replaced with a robot. That said, here is the 
Bad Action version of the Rollback case, featuring an agent: 
Rollback: Imagine there is a universe that is re-created over and over again, starting from 
the exact same initial conditions and with all the same laws of nature. In this universe the 
same conditions and the same laws of nature produce the exact same outcomes, so that 
every single time the universe is re-created, everything must happen the exact same way. 
For instance, in this universe a person named Jeremy decides to rob a bank at a particular 
time, and every time the universe is re-created, Jeremy decides to rob a bank at that 
time.7 
As in the Supercomputer case, in the Good Action version, robbing was replaced with saving a 
child. And again the Entity was varied by replacing Jeremy with a robot. 
 
6 This scenario was taken directly from Nahmias et al. (2005; 2006). 
7 This scenario was taken directly from Nahmias et al. (2005; 2006). There were two differences: First we used Jeremy 
rather than Jill so as not to introduce gender as a confound. Second, we had Jeremy rob a bank so that the severity 
of the action was the same in Supercomputer and Rollback (here again, to avoid a potential confound). 
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The abstract versions varied in whether the entity described in the scenario was an agent 
or robot and in whether they described determinism in terms of a supercomputer or rollback. 
Here is the Abstract Supercomputer case: 
Abstract Supercomputer: Imagine that in the next century we discover all the laws of 
nature, and we build a supercomputer which can deduce from these laws of nature and 
from the current state of everything in the world exactly what will be happening in the 
world at any future time. It can look at everything about the way the world is and predict 
everything about how it will be with 100% accuracy. Suppose that such a supercomputer 
existed, and it looks at the state of the universe at a certain time on March 25th, 2150 
A.D., twenty years before a person is born. The computer then deduces from this 
information and the laws of nature what this person will do at any given time. 
And here is the abstract rollback case: 
Abstract Rollback: Imagine there is a universe that is re-created over and over again, 
starting from the exact same initial conditions and with all the same laws of nature. In this 
universe the same conditions and the same laws of nature produce the exact same 
outcomes, so that every single time the universe is re-created, everything must happen 
the exact same way. For instance, a person in this universe will perform the same actions, 
at the same times, every time this universe is re-created. 
After reading one of the twelve cases, participants were asked the following (in fixed order):8 
 
8 We borrowed this “suspension of belief” paradigm from Nahmias et al. (2005; 2006). They adopted this conditional 
approach in the event that some participants would not find the scenarios to be possible. We followed their lead in 
our present studies.  
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Possible: Do you think this scenario is possible? [Yes/No] 
Explain: Please briefly explain your answer. 
Next, participants read the following instructions:  
Regardless of how you answered the previous question, imagine such a supercomputer 
actually did exist and actually could predict the future, including Jeremy’s robbing the 
bank (and assume Jeremy does not know about the prediction) [or imagine such a 
universe actually did exist and that every time it is recreated everything must happen the 
same way].  
Now please note your level of agreement (or disagreement) with the following 
statements. Remember that the statements are specifically about the scenario you just 
read. 
Participants in all conditions then rated their agreement on a standard 7-pt Likert scale (1 = 
strongly disagree and 7 = strongly agree) for eleven different test statements,9 all of which were 
presented in random order.10 Here are the versions of the test statements used in the concrete 
version of the supercomputer case where Jeremy robbed a bank: 
Free Will: Jeremy robbed the bank of his own free will. 
 
9 We made appropriate wording adjustments depending on the case (e.g., the items were worded differently for 
Supercomputer and Rollback since the background conditions are not the same). 
10 In Nahmias et al. (2005; 2006), they asked questions about free will and moral responsibility—namely, “Do you 
think that, when Jeremy robs the bank, he acts of his own free will [is morally blameworthy for robbing the bank]?” 
They also asked a question about whether the agents in the scenarios had the ability to “choose to do otherwise.” 
In all three cases, answer choices were dichotomous. Given our interest in a wider variety of issues and in more fine-




Freely Decide: Jeremy freely decided to rob the bank. 
Determined: Jeremy was determined to rob the bank. 
No Option: Jeremy had no other option than to rob the bank. 
Avoid: Jeremy can avoid doing what the computer predicts he will do. 
Ability: Jeremy has the ability to change his mind about robbing the bank. 
Responsible: Jeremy is fully morally responsible for robbing the bank. 
Ultimately: It was ultimately up to Jeremy to decide to rob the bank. 
Slight Chance: There was at least a slight chance that Jeremy would not rob the bank as 
the computer predicted he would. 
Do Otherwise: Even though Jeremy actually did what the computer predicted he would 
do, it was possible for Jeremy to do something else instead at the time. 
Scenario Determinism: According to the scenario, the supercomputer can deduce from 
the laws of nature and from the current state of everything in the world exactly what will 
be happening in the world at any future time.11 
Also included in each condition, were three further test questions that utilized different scales: 
 
11 This item is modelled on the comprehension question used in Nahmias et al. (2005; 2006). It is simply a 
restatement of deterministic features directly described in the scenarios. Following their lead, we, too, used Scenario 
Determinism as a comprehension check. The overwhelming majority of participants (93%) correctly identified the 
scenarios as deterministic (that is, they somewhat agreed, agreed, or strongly agreed with this statement). So, we 
only excluded 88 out of 1,296 participants from our analysis. Nevertheless, as we will see, intrusion effects were 
common. This suggests that while most participants correctly identified the very features of the scenarios that made 
them deterministic, many still either failed to comprehend the broader implications of determinism or failed to hold 
these implications constant.  
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Praise/Blame: Jeremy is _________ for his decisions and actions. (1=very praiseworthy, 
7=very blameworthy) 
Reward/Punish: Jeremy deserves _______ for his decisions and actions. (1=a substantial 
reward, 7=a substantial punishment) 
Chance: What do you think the chances are that Jeremy will do something different than 
what the computer predicts he will do? (Slider scale ranging from 0=very unlikely to 
100=very likely) 
Once participants provided their responses to these dependent variables, they were presented 
with Part 1 and Part 2 of The Free Will Inventory (FWI: Nadelhoffer et al., 2014)—which is a scale 
designed to measure beliefs about free will, determinism, dualism, and related constructs. 
Because we included FWI for exploratory purposes, we ultimately decided not to analyze the 
results as part of the present paper.12  
4. Results  
Since Scenario Determinism was designed to serve as a comprehension check, we removed 
participants who gave a rating between 1 and 4. This choice was made to cohere with the analytic 
strategy used by prior researchers (see Nahmias et. al., 2005; 2006) and did not affect any of the 
central findings reported below. Eighty-eight people were removed resulting in N = 1,296 final 
participants. Next we created three new variables: Free Will, Intrusion and Blame. The full set of 
variables we will analyze is in Table 1. 
 
12 The complete data set and supplemental materials (including stimuli, dependent variables for all vignettes, and 
analyses not included in the paper) can be found at: https://osf.io/4z6r2/ 
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Table 1: Items for used for data analysis 
Variable Item(s) Cronbach’s 
Alpha 
Free Will Free Will: Jeremy robbed the bank of his own free will. 
Freely Decide: Jeremy freely decided to rob the bank. 
Ultimately: It was ultimately up to Jeremy to decide to rob 
the bank. 
.923 
Intrusion No Option: Jeremy had no other option than to rob the 
bank.13 
Avoid: Jeremy can avoid doing what the computer predicts 
he will do. 
Ability: Jeremy has the ability to change his mind about 
robbing the bank. 
Slight Chance: There was at least a slight chance that 




13 Since disagreement on this indicates intrusion while on all other intrusion items, agreement indicates intrusion, 
this was reverse coded. 
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Do Otherwise: Even though Jeremy actually did what the 
computer predicted he would do, it was possible for Jeremy 
to do something else instead at the time. 
Praise/Blame Praise/Blame: Jeremy is _________ for his decisions and 
actions.  
Reward/Punish: Jeremy deserves _______ for his decisions 
and actions. 
.928 
Responsibility14 Responsible: Jeremy is fully morally responsible for robbing 
the bank. 
n/a 
Determined Determined: Jeremy was determined to rob the bank. n/a 
Chance15 Chance: What do you think the chances are that Jeremy will 





Since our design was not a full factorial design, we will begin by analyzing responses in the 
concrete versions before presenting responses in the abstract versions. 
 
14 This was not combined with the items for Praise/Blame since this item has a different scale. 
15 This was not combined with the items for Intrusion since this item used a different scale. 
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We conducted six separate 2(Case: Supercomputer, Rollback) x 2( Entity: Agent, Robot) x 
2 (Action: Good, Bad) ANOVAs, one for each dependent measure. See Table 1.   
Free Will: There was a main effect of Case, F(1, 854)=72.007, p<.001, ηp2=.078 and Entity, 
F(1, 854)=367.846, p<.001, ηp2=.301 but no effect of Action, F(1, 854)=.404, p=.524, ηp2=.000. 
There was a two-way interaction between Case and Entity, F(1, 854)=6.475, p<.05, ηp2=.008 and 
between Entity and Action F(1, 854)=7.814, p<.01, ηp2=.009 but no two-way interaction between 
Case and Action, F(1, 854)=2.236, p=.135, ηp2=.003. The three-way interaction between Case, 
Entity and Action was also significant, F(1, 854)=7.796, p<.01, ηp2=.009. 
Intrusion: There was a main effect of Case, F(1, 854)=195.818, p<.001, ηp2=.187 and 
Entity, F(1, 854)=128.996, p<.001, ηp2=.131 but no effect of Action, F(1, 854)=1.755, p=.186, 
ηp2=.002. None of the two- or three-way interactions were significant: Case and Entity, F(1, 
854)=1.274, p=.259, ηp2=.001; Case and Action F(1, 854)=.654, p=.419, ηp2=.001; Entity and 
Action, F(1, 854)=2.090, p=.149, ηp2=.002; Case, Entity and Action, F(1, 854)=2.622, p.106, 
ηp2=.003. 
Praise/Blame: There was a main effect of Action, F(1, 854)=1485.696, p<.001, ηp2=.635, 
but no effect of Case, F(1, 854)=2.389, p=.123, ηp2=.003 or Entity, F(1, 854)=2.250, p<=.134, 
ηp2=.003. There was a two-way interaction between Entity and Action, F(1, 854)=191.163, 
p<.001, ηp2=.183 and Case and Action, F(1, 854)=25.279, p<.001, ηp2=.029, but no interaction 
between Case and Entity F(1, 854)=1.502, p=.221, ηp2=.002. The three-way interaction between 
Case, Entity and Action was not significant, F(1, 854)=.114, p=.736, ηp2=.000. 
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Responsibility: There was a main effect of Case, F(1, 854)=15.469, p<.001, ηp2=.018, 
Entity, F(1, 854)=306.709, p<.001, ηp2=.264 and Action, F(1, 854)=4.247, p<.05, ηp2=.005. There 
was a two-way interaction between Entity and Action, F(1, 854)=14.072, p<.001, ηp2=.016 but 
no interaction between Case and Entity F(1, 854)=.888, p=.346, ηp2=.001 or Case and Action, F(1, 
854)=1.806, p=.179, ηp2=.002. The three-way interaction between Case, Entity and Action was 
not significant, F(1, 854)=.220, p=.639, ηp2=.000. 
Determined: There was a main effect of Entity, F(1, 854)=24.395, p<.001, ηp2=.028 but no 
effect of either Case, F(1, 854)=.603, p=, ηp2=.001 or Action, F(1, 854)=.649, p=.421, ηp2=.001. 
There were no significant two-way interactions: Case and Entity, F(1, 854)=2.375, p=.124, 
ηp2=.003; Entity and Action F(1, 854)=.118, p=.731, ηp2=.000; Case and Action, F(1, 854)=.013, 
p=.908, ηp2=.000. The three-way interaction between Case, Entity and Action was also not 
significant, F(1, 854)=3.646, p=.056, ηp2=.004. 
Chance: There was a main effect of Case, F(1, 854)=89.950, p<.001, ηp2=.095 and Entity, 
F(1, 854)=20.888, p<.001, ηp2=.024 but no effect of Action, F(1, 854)=.256, p=.613, ηp2=.000. 
There were no significant two-way interactions: Case and Entity, F(1, 854)=.016, p=.900, 
ηp2=.000; Entity and Action F(1, 854)=.034, p=.854, ηp2=.000; Case and Action, F(1, 854)=.337, 
p=.562, ηp2=.000. The three-way interaction between Case, Entity and Action was also not 
significant, F(1, 854)=.001, p=.970, ηp2=.000. 
Figs. 1 and 2 visualize the findings—with the primary focus on differences between the 
Agent and Robot cases—for both the Supercomputer and Rollback cases. Since Chance utilized a 




Fig. 1: Agent and Robot results for Supercomputer concrete cases with 95% confidence intervals. 




































































































































































Fig. 2: Agent and Robot results for Rollback concrete cases. 1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly 
agree 
 
Fig. 3: Agent and Robot results for concrete cases. 0 = very unlikely; 100 = very likely 
Having analyzed the concrete cases, we next turned our attention to the abstract cases. 
The first thing worth noting on this front is that in the abstract conditions, praise/blame and 
reward/punish questions were not included and so will be excluded from analysis. We conducted 
five separate 2(Case: Supercomputer, Rollback) x 2(Entity: Agent, Robot) ANOVAs, one for each 
dependent measure (excluding blame). See Table 1.  
Free Will: There was a main effect of Case, F(1, 430)=76.701, p<.001, ηp2=.151 and Entity, 
F(1, 430)=221.877, p<.001, ηp2=.340, as well as a two-way interaction between Case and Entity, 




























Intrusion: There was a main effect of Case, F(1, 430)=102.110, p<.001, ηp2=.192 and 
Entity, F(1, 430)=85.357, p<.001, ηp2=.166, as well as a two-way interaction between Case and 
Entity, F(1, 430)=8.709, p<.01, ηp2=.049.  
Responsibility: There was a main effect of Case, F(1, 430)=23.581, p<.001, ηp2=.052 and 
Entity, F(1, 430)=225.451, p<.001, ηp2=.453, and a two-way interaction between Case and Entity, 
F(1, 430)=18.057, p<.001, ηp2=.040.  
Determined: There was a main effect of Case, F(1, 430)=7.660, p<.01, ηp2=.151 and Entity, 
F(1, 430)=20.633, p<.001, ηp2=.046, but no two-way interaction between Case and Entity, F(1, 
430)=.026, p=.872, ηp2=.000.  
Chance: There was a main effect of Case, F(1, 430)=63.218, p<.001, ηp2=.128 and Entity, 
F(1, 430)=50.234, p<.001, ηp2=.105, as well as a two-way interaction between Case and Entity, 
F(1, 430)=8.661, p<.01, ηp2=.020.  
Fig. 4 presents a visualization of the differences between the agent and robot versions in 
the abstract cases. Again since chance ratings were made on a different scale, these are shown 




Fig. 4: Agent and Robot differences in abstract cases with 95% confidence interval. 1 = strongly 























































Fig. 5: Agent and Robot differences in chance judgments. 0 = very unlikely; 100 = very likely 
There are two final predictions we made regarding intrusion. First, Chance asks, e.g., 
“What do you think the chances are that Jeremy will do something different than what the 
computer predicts he will do?” People made ratings on a slider scale ranging from 0 (very 
unlikely) to 100 (very likely). If we take ratings of 0 on Chance to indicate that people are not 
succumbing to intrusion and ratings greater than 0 to indicate that people are succumbing to 
intrusion then we can ask whether there are differences on both of our measures of free will. We 
predicted that there should be. In particular, those who give ratings of higher than 0 on Chance 
should be more inclined to attribute free will. Moreover, that effect should be more pronounced 
in cases featuring an agent. In other words, we predicted an interaction between Entity and 
Chance on free will judgments. 
Beginning with the concrete versions, and collapsing across Case, 50% of participants gave 
a rating of greater than 0 on Chance. We found a main effect of both Chance F (1, 858) = 70.687, 
p<.001, ηp2= .076, and Entity F (1, 858) = 331.021, p<.001, ηp2= .278, on Free Will. Importantly, 
we found a two-way interaction between Chance and Entity, F (1, 858) = 9.505, p<.01, ηp2= .011.  
For the abstract cases, and again collapsing across Case, 64% of participants gave a rating 
of greater than 0 on Chance.16 We again found a main effect of both Chance F (1, 430) = 143.746, 
p<.001, ηp2= .251, and Entity F (1, 430) = 161.441, p<.001, ηp2= .273, on Free Will. Again, and 
 
16 We were surprised that intrusion was more prevalent in the abstract cases than in the concrete cases. One 
possibility is that the abstract nature of the case itself leads to more options for filling in details with one’s own 
(indeterministic) view. In concrete cases, more stipulation/detail might impede that somewhat—though, as we find, 
intrusion still occurs at an alarming rate even in the concrete cases. Of course, this is just a hunch. More work on the 
asymmetry of intrusion effects in concrete and abstract cases would need to be done to know how best to explain 
these results.  
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importantly, we found a two-way interaction between Chance and Entity, F (1, 430) = 30.432, 
p<.001, ηp2= .066. The results are shown in Fig. 6. 
 
 
Fig. 6: Chance Intrusion Effects on Free Will for Concrete and Abstract cases with 95% Confidence 
Intervals. 1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree 
To take all of this one step further, we make one final prediction. Rose et al. (2017) used 
perfect neuro-prediction and manipulation cases to manipulate intrusion. The expectation was 
that people's intuitive views about agency would intrude into the representation of 
neuroscientific scenarios when making free will judgments. And thus they hypothesized—and 
presented evidence—that “intuitive free will judgments cause people to misrepresent instances 
of perfect neuro-prediction” (2017, p. 487). In our cases here—Supercomputer and Rollback—






























we predict that intuitive views about agency—and indeterministic metaphysics—intrude into 
people’s representations of Supercomputer and Rollback when making free will judgments and 
cause them to misrepresent the scenarios. To determine whether this is the case, our focus will 
be on free will judgments and what is perhaps our best measure of intrusion: Chance.  
We conducted four separate mediation analyses, one for each of our cases, 
Supercomputer and Rollback, in the concrete and abstract conditions. First, we analyze the 
concrete cases. For Supercomputer, a regression model with Entity as a predictor of Chance was 
significant, t(402) = −2.835, β = −.140, p < .01; a regression model with Entity as a predictor of 
Free Will was significant, t(402) = −14.821, β = −.595, p < .001; a regression model with Free Will 
as a predictor of Chance was significant, t(402) = 4.854, β = .236, p < .001; but a multiple 
regression model with both Entity and Free Will as predictors of Chance indicated that the effect 
of Entity was no longer significant, t(402) = -.001, β = .000, p = .999. We also tested the alternative 
mediation model (see e.g., Rose and Nichols 2013; Rose et al. 2012 Rose 2017; Rose and Nichols 
2019 a; Rose and Nichols 2019 b; Rose and Nichols 2020; Rose et al. forthcoming; Turri, 
Buckwalter, & Rose, 2016). A multiple regression model with both Entity and Chance as 
predictors of Free Will showed that Entity significantly predicted Free Will, t(402) = −14.385, β = 
−.573, p < .001, but that Chance did not mediate the effect of Entity on Free Will. 
For Rollback, a regression model with Entity as a predictor of Chance was significant, 
t(458) = −3.822, β = −.176, p < .001; a regression model with Entity as a predictor of Free Will was 
significant, t(458) = −11.838, β = −.484, p < .001; a regression model with Free Will as a predictor 
of Chance was significant, t(458) = 5.760, β = .260, p < .001; but a multiple regression model with 
both Entity and Free Will as predictors of Chance indicated that the effect of Entity was no longer 
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significant, t(458) = -1.263, β = -.065, p = .207. The alternative mediation model with both Entity 
and Chance as predictors of Free Will showed that Entity significantly predicted Free Will, t(458) 
= −11.108, β = −.453, p < .001, but that Chance did not mediate the effect of Entity on Free Will. 
So in the concrete versions of both Supercomputer and Rollback, we find evidence that 
Free Will mediates the effect of Entity on Chance. These models can be seen in Fig. 7.  
 
Fig. 7: Concrete Mediation Models for Supercomputer (Left) and Rollback (Right) 
We consider next whether there is mediation in the abstract versions of these cases. For 
Supercomputer, a regression model with Entity as a predictor of Chance was significant, t(215) = 
−7.095, β = −.436, p < .001; a regression model with Entity as a predictor of Free Will was 
significant, t(215) = −15.295, β = −.723, p < .001; a regression model with Free Will as a predictor 
of Chance was significant, t(215) = 11.065, β = .603, p < .001; but a multiple regression model 
with both Entity and Free Will as predictors of Chance indicated that the effect of Entity was no 
longer significant, t(215) = -.012, β = -.001, p = .991. The alternative model with both Entity and 
Chance as predictors of Free Will showed that Entity significantly predicted Free Will, t(215) = 
−12.163, β = −.567, p < .001, but that Chance did not mediate the effect of Entity on Free Will. 
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For Rollback, a regression model with Entity as a predictor of Chance was significant, 
t(217) = −2.930, β = −.196, p < .01; a regression model with Entity as a predictor of Free Will was 
significant, t(217) = −6.639, β = −.412, p < .001; a regression model with Free Will as a predictor 
of Chance was significant, t(217) = 10.187, β = .570, p < .001; but a multiple regression model 
with both Entity and Free Will as predictors of Chance indicated that the effect of Entity was no 
longer significant, t(217) = .765, β = .047, p = .445. The alternative mediation model with both 
Entity and Chance as predictors of Free Will showed that Entity significantly predicted Free Will, 
t(217) = −5.887, β = −.312, p < .001, but that Chance did not mediate the effect of Entity on Free 
Will. These models are shown in Fig. 8. 
 
Fig. 8: Abstract Mediation Models for Supercomputer (Left) and Rollback (Right) 
In every single case, we found that Free Will mediates the effect of Entity on Chance. This 
coheres with the findings of Rose et al. (2017) and extends those findings to the leading, classic 
cases supporting natural compatibilism. We also note that just like with Chance, Slight Chance 
(one of the items included in our composite measure of intrusion) gives a very similar picture.17 
 
17 We will explain why we looked at Slight Chance on its own in §5. 
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For the concrete cases we find a main effect of Case, F(1, 854)=115.707, p<.001, ηp2=.119 and 
Entity, F(1, 854)=19.214, p<.001, ηp2=.022 but no effect of Action, F(1, 854)=.387, p=.534, 
ηp2=.000. Moreover, just as with Chance, there were no significant two- or three-way 
interactions (all p’s >.05). Similarly, in the abstract cases, there was a main effect of Case, F(1, 
430)=69.074, p<.001, ηp2=.138 and Entity, F(1, 430)=12.302, p<.01, ηp2=.028, but no two-way 
interaction between Case and Entity, F(1, 430)=.749, p=.387, ηp2=.002. Importantly, if we instead 
run all the same mediation analyses using Slight Chance, in virtually every single case Free Will 
mediates the effect of Entity on Slight Chance and Slight Chance doesn’t mediate the effect of 
Entity on Free Will in any of these models.18 
In short, whether we focus on the composite measure  of intrusion or individual measures 
like Slight Chance or Chance, we find evidence that intuitive views about the indeterministic 
nature of human agency influence how people understand deterministic cases like 
Supercomputer and Rollback when they are making free will judgments. Owing to this 
indeterministic intrusion, most people have a difficult time adequately tracking the determinism 
built into two of the central scenarios that have been used to support natural compatibilism. 
While this is our key finding, there are a number of other issues raised by our results that also 
 
18 For the concrete Supercomputer cases, a multiple regression model with both Entity and Free Will as predictors 
of Slight Chance indicated that the effect of Entity was not significant, t(402) = .404, β = .024, p = .686; for the 
concrete Rollback cases, a multiple regression model with both Entity and Free Will as predictors of Slight Chance 
indicated that the effect of Entity was not significant, t(458) = -.914, β = -.047, p = .361; for the abstract Rollback 
cases, a multiple regression model with both Entity and Free Will as predictors of Slight Chance indicated that the 
effect of Entity was not significant, t(217) = 1.615, β = .102, p = .108; and for the abstract Supercomputer cases, a 
multiple regression model with both Entity and Free Will as predictors of Slight Chance indicated that the effect of 




merit further consideration. So, we are now going to unpack some of the things we found along 
the way and discuss the downstream implications. 
5. Discussion  
The first thing that merits discussion is that 66% of participants didn’t think the scenarios were 
possible. This concords with the earlier findings by Nahmias et al. (2005; 2006) which is why we 
borrowed their “suspension of belief” paradigm for our present study. One likely explanation for 
this finding is that people are indeterminists about human agency. For instance, Bloom (2012) 
suggests that “common sense tells us we exist outside the material world,” and Knobe (2014) 
similarly claims that according to folk psychology, “human actions are not caused by prior events” 
(79). However, the commonsense view need not be transcendent or supernatural to be 
indeterministic. As Turri (2017c) recently pointed out, “It could be that, on the ordinary 
understanding, human agency fits broadly within the causal order while still being exceptional in 
some respects. For example, people might think that human actions are caused by psychological, 
neurological, and social events, even though human agents can resist causal forces in ways that 
inanimate objects cannot” (2-3). Importantly, according to Turri’s findings, people think that 
human agents—unlike robots—can resist causal forces described as inevitable, guaranteed, or 
causally determined even though human agents are at the same time viewed as part of the 
natural world.  
Figuring out the contours of folk views about indeterminism and human exceptionalism  
is a task for another day. We mention these issues here given their likely relationship with the 
intrusion effects that are our focus. We believe that the main reason that intrusion effects are 
prevalent is that indeterminism about human agency is the default folk view. That so many 
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participants find deterministic scenarios to be impossible highlights the intuitive appeal of an 
indeterministic metaphysics. It also presumably partly explains why some people appear to have 
such a hard time tracking determinism. At a minimum, the fact that so many people found the 
scenarios to be impossible should weaken our confidence in their subsequent intuitions about 
what is possible in these scenarios (e.g., free will, moral responsibility, the ability to do otherwise, 
etc.). Given that these scenarios are widely deemed to be impossible—which is telling in itself—
we think it is safe to assume that they likely invite confusion and misunderstanding from the 
outset.19 
Second, as indicated by the main effect of Case, judgments about free will and moral 
responsibility tended to be higher in Supercomputer than in Rollback. This suggests that Rollback 
may be more compellingly deterministic than Supercomputer. An additional reason to think that 
Rollback might be more compellingly deterministic is that participants were more likely to find 
the former possible than the later. In the concrete scenarios, 77% thought the scenario was not 
possible in Supercomputer and 56% thought it was not possible in Rollback. This difference was 
significant X2(1)=44.739, p<.001, Cramer’s V=.228.  In the abstract scenarios, 79% thought it was 
not possible in Supercomputer and 56% thought it was not possible in Rollback. This difference 
was significant X2(1)=26.431, p<.001, Cramer’s V=.247. These differences could be because 
 
19 It is worth noting that while most participants appear to find the scenarios to be counter-intuitive, the 
overwhelming majority correctly responded to the comprehension check we designed to make sure they understand 
in a broad sense that the scenarios were deterministic. So, this suggests that they don’t find determinism 
inconceivable or incomprehensible. For instance, it’s not that participants don’t understand the notion of perfect 
prediction, they just likely think it’s impossible that a computer will ever be developed that has the ability to perfectly 
predict everything that happens in the universe.  
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participants found the determinism built into Supercomputer—based as it is on perfect 
prediction by a  computer—to be less plausible than the determinism built into Rollback.  
In short, perfect prediction may not be the most intuitive way of capturing the salient 
features of determinism.20 After all, predictions may be naturally viewed indeterministically given 
our common experiences with otherwise reliable predictions gone awry. Given that determinism 
is explained in terms of perfect prediction in Supercomputer, this may lead to less reliably 
deterministic intuitions in those cases. On the other hand, it is more difficult to give Rollback a 
similar indeterministic gloss since it explicitly states that given the same initial conditions and the 
same laws, the universe must turn out the same way every time it is recreated—that is, it’s not 
treated as a prediction but rather as an entailment. So, while we do find intrusion effects even in 
the more convincingly deterministic rollback scenarios, these effects are less prevalent than in 
the supercomputer cases. This difference between the plausibility of various descriptions of 
determinism is something researchers should bear in mind in the future. It’s not enough to simply 
describe determinism—it must be described in a way that people find as intuitive as possible. 
Third, as expected, and as indicated by the main effect of Entity on judgments about free 
will and responsibility,  agents were deemed to be more free and responsible than robots. This is 
precisely why we included some cases involving agents and some involving robots. We predicted 
that these latter cases would be less likely to elicit indeterministic intrusion effects, which were 
the primary focus of our study. The robot cases gave us a way of trying to minimize intrusion 
effects and served as an illustrative contrast class to the agent cases. As one can see in Fig. 3, 
participants’ intuitions about Chance—arguably our strongest measure of intrusion (see below 
 
20 If this is right, it likely applies to the neuroprediction used in Nahmias et al. (2014). 
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for details)—were much weaker in the robot cases than in the agent cases.21 This comports with 
the findings by Turri (2017c) whereby people tend to view the behavior of robots as less 
avoidable (i.e., more deterministic) and view the behavior as agents as more avoidable (i.e., more 
indeterministic). According to his findings, people tend to believe that whereas humans have the 
ability do otherwise (which is an important element of free will), robots largely lack this ability. 
Given that attributions of free will were also weaker in our robot cases, this fits with our overall 
expectations concerning the relationship between free will beliefs and the intrusion of an 
indeterministic metaphysics in otherwise deterministic scenarios.  
Part of what people seem to be considering when making judgments about free will is 
whether the agent could have avoided doing what he or she did given the circumstances at the 
time. That is presumably why indeterministic intrusion is so prevalent when it comes to 
judgments about free will involving agents. Agents, unlike robots, are paradigmatically 
indeterministic beings who have the ability to do otherwise under ordinary circumstances. As 
such, when people are presented with agents in deterministic scenarios—which they find 
counter-intuitive, as we’ve seen—the most obvious way to preserve the agents’ freedom and 
responsibility is to unwittingly view them through the lens of indeterminism, even in 
experimental contexts where researchers don’t want them to do so. This kind of indeterminism 
may be baked into our ordinary conception of agency. When people are presented instead with 
robots in deterministic scenarios, there isn’t the same temptation to view them through the lens 
 
21 It is still noteworthy that we nevertheless did find intrusion effects even in the robot cases—which speaks to the 
prevalence of indeterministic intrusion. 
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of indeterminism—which explains why both intrusion and attribution of free will are lower in 
these cases than in cases involving agents. 
In this way, our intrusion measure Chance may tap into a very common way people think 
about their own agency and responsibility. After all, it often feels as if there is a real chance 
people can avoid doing whatever has been forecasted for them to do. Even the best predictions 
fall apart when it comes to human behavior. So, it only makes sense that the indeterministic 
notion of chance might be enmeshed with our ordinary understanding of free will. In some sense, 
chance provides the possibility space which we then navigate using our capacity for free and 
responsible agency. To say that there is a chance that an agent’s future unfolds in more than one 
way is to view the agent as if his life is a kind of garden of forking paths, which is a common 
metaphor in the free will literature.  
If this is right—that is, if chance plays an important role in how people ordinarily think 
about free will—it would help explain why 50% of people in the concrete cases and 68% of our 
participants in the abstract cases, seemed to be tacitly importing misplaced indeterministic 
assumptions into our deterministic scenarios.22 Indeed, if we treated Chance as a genuine 
comprehension check, then people who answered Chance incorrectly would be excluded from 
our analysis of the data. Recoding Chance so that those who answered it correctly, that is, 
answered zero are grouped together, and those who answered it incorrectly—that is, indicated 
that there was a greater than zero chance—are grouped together, the findings concerning free 
 
22 That is, if we recode Chance, assigning 0 to those who said there was zero chance and 1 to those who said there 
is greater than zero chance, we find that 50%-68% of people said there was greater than zero chance that the agent 
could have acted differently.  
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will judgments change significantly, Concrete: X2(1)=53.432, p<.001, Cramer’s V=.257; Abstract: 
X2(1)=43.393, p<.001, Cramer’s V=.324. This can be seen in Table 2 below.  
 Free Will (Yes)23   
 Zero Chance Greater Than Zero 
Concrete 27% 52% 
Abstract 13% 45% 
 
Table 2: Percent Affirming Free Will  by whether the participant correctly answers Chance (Zero) 
or incorrectly answers Chance (Greater than Zero) for both Concrete and Abstract cases.  
These findings on the relationship between Chance and judgments about free will 
problematize the conclusions drawn by Nahmias and colleagues (2005; 2006). As we saw earlier, 
65-85% of their participants who read Supercomputer or Rollback judged that Jeremy was free 
and responsible. They took these results to support natural compatibilism. However, using those 
same scenarios coupled with a way of measuring intrusion, we found instead that most of the 
participants who appeared to be compatibilists are importing indeterminism. Once we include 
only people who said there was zero chance, and focus only on the cases featuring an agent, 
while collapsing across all other variables, only 39% judged that the agent was free, which is 
significantly below chance, binomial test, p<.001. Not only do we find much less support for 
natural compatibilism as a general matter than Nahmias and colleagues, but our findings suggest 
that people who are prone to indeterministic intrusion are far more likely to judge that an agent 
 
23 Ratings from 5-7 were taken to indicate free will was attributed. 
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in a deterministic scenario has free will. In the abstract cases—where people who are prone to 
intrusion are roughly four times more likely to attribute free will than people who are not prone 
to intrusion—this difference is especially prominent. It appears that the belief in indeterministic 
chance is a driving force behind people’s judgments concerning free and responsible agency.   
In light of these findings, we believe that we have provided evidence that (a) intrusion 
effects are prevalent in response to the kinds of scenarios used by natural compatibilists, and (b) 
intrusion effects are closely related to people’s intuitions about free will even in the face of 
determinism. As such, we believe that our findings problematize the evidence that has been used 
to support natural compatibilism. It’s not that no participants give properly compatibilist 
answers, it’s just that that these answers are far less common than natural compatibilists have 
assumed. So, how might they respond?  
The most obvious rejoinder for natural compatibilists is to deny that our intrusion items 
are properly construed as measures of creeping indeterminism. On this view, our items beg the 
question against compatibilism and our findings can be given a compatibilist-friendly 
interpretation. Here, the natural compatibilist is likely to appeal to the difference between the 
unconditional and the conditional ability to do otherwise. In an indeterministic universe, agents 
can have the unconditional ability to do otherwise—that is, they could have done otherwise even 
if everything leading up to their decision remained exactly the same. In a deterministic universe, 
on the other hand, agents merely have the conditional ability to do otherwise—that is, agents 
could have acted differently only insofar as something (either the past or the laws) had been 
different than it actually was. Compatibilists suggest that this conditional ability to do otherwise 
(along with other cognitive and volitional capacities) can ground free will and moral responsibility 
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even in a deterministic universe. Incompatibilists disagree, insisting instead that free will requires 
indeterminism and the unconditional ability to do otherwise.  
We can set the metaphysical debate aside for now. The relevant question is whether our 
intrusion items are more plausibility interpreted via the unconditional or the conditional lens. 
We think the unconditional reading is the most natural one. Consider, for instance, Chance, our 
primary measure of intrusion. Given the details of the scenarios, there was no chance 
(metaphysically speaking) that Jeremy would or could actually do something other than what was 
predicted at the time. So, the compatibilist has to insist instead that chance in this context refers 
to the mere possibility that things could have been different had the antecedent conditions been 
different. If we construe chance this way, though, then we must conclude that chance is always 
operating in the universe since, except under fatalism, there is always a chance  that things could 
have been different in the compatibilist sense. This makes the concept of chance entirely vacuous 
(since it always applies whether the universe is deterministic or indeterministic). And while it’s 
certainly possible that this is what participants had in mind when thinking about Chance, we don’t 
think it’s plausible to think that this is what most of them actually had in mind. That’s precisely 
why we focused on Chance more than the other items for measuring intrusion. It seems to us to 
be the least susceptible to the compatibilist’s attempted conditional gloss. When people think 
about an overtly indeterministic item like Chance, we think the extant research on people’s 
preferences for the unconditional reading of both free will and the ability to do otherwise 
suggests that most of our participants likely viewed Chance through an unconditional lens (Deery, 
Bedke, and Nichols, 2013; Nadelhoffer et al., 2014; Nadelhoffer et al., 2019a; 2019b; Nichols, 
2006; Wisniewski, Deutschländer, & Haynes, 2019; cf. Nahmias et al. 2004). 
36 
 
It’s also worth noting at this juncture that Slight Chance is very similar to Chance in this 
regard. The conditional reading is prima facie implausible here as well. That is precisely why we 
analyzed Slight Chance separately in the previous section—namely, we wanted to see whether it 
performed much like Chance (which it did). This is important because Slight Chance is one of the 
items we used for the composite measure—which had excellent reliability (α = .906). Given that 
Slight Chance is most naturally understood unconditionally and given that the group of items 
including Slight Chance has excellent reliability, this suggests that it is likely that the other items 
in the group are also being interpreted unconditionally. If Slight Chance were being interpreted 
unconditionally while the other intrusion items were being interpreted conditionally, it is unlikely 
that they would have fit together reliably as we found. As such, we think that our findings 
concerning Slight Chance bolster our unconditional reading of the other intrusion items used in 
the composite measure.  
The compatibilist’s conditional reading of our intrusion items runs into similar problems 
when it comes to explaining our finding that intrusion is more prevalent in agents than in robots. 
Given our unconditional reading of our intrusion items, we have a readymade explanation of this 
asymmetry—namely, human agents are more likely to be viewed through the lens of 
indeterminism while robots are more likely to be viewed through the lens of determinism. 
Consequently, we predicted intrusion would be more prevalent in the agent cases than in the 
robot cases. How is the compatibilist supposed to explain this difference? The conditional gloss 
won’t help. After all, if we adopt the conditional reading of our intrusion items, then it turns out 
that the robot could have done otherwise, could have avoided the outcome, had other options 
than robbing the bank, etc. For on the conditional reading, this amounts to nothing more than 
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the fact that had the past or the laws been different, the robot could have and would have done 
something different. Given that Turri (2017c) found that people don’t think robots have the 
ability do otherwise precisely because they are taken to be more deterministic, this suggests that 
the notion of ability people are applying in these sorts of cases is the unconditional ability. 
Otherwise, robots, too, would be judged to have the ability to do otherwise since they clearly 
have the kind of conditional abilities highlighted by compatibilists. 
In short, we believe that our findings suggest that not all ascriptions of free will in the face 
of determinism reflect an underlying compatibilist metaphysics as natural compatibilists have 
assumed. Some of these ascriptions reflect instead the intrusion of indeterminism. If this is 
correct, the natural compatibilist must devise a strategy for separating the compatibilist wheat 
from the indeterministic chaff if she wants to provide compelling evidence for her view. So, while 
it is likely true that some participants adopt a conditional reading, to problematize natural 
compatibilism we need only show that indeterministic intrusion is commonplace. And for that, 
we need only show that it is more likely than not that a number of participants adopt the 
unconditional reading that has been our focus in this section. 
We’ve tried to provide both a priori reasons and empirical evidence for thinking that the 
unconditional reading is the most natural interpretation of most participants’ judgments. But 
most compatibilists will likely still take issue with the wording of our items and our interpretation 
of the findings. This is a limitation of any study that explores folk judgments about free will 
because the parties to the debate often claim that certain stimuli and measures beg the 
metaphysical question in various ways. Because we think Chance is the most difficult intrusion 
item for compatibilists to explain away, we made it our focus. But if compatibilists have a better 
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way of ensuring that participants are tracking determinism, we are clearly open to suggestions. 
Given that compatibilists are the ones who claim that most people think that free will and moral 
responsibility are compatible with determinism, we think the onus is on them to ensure that 
participants aren’t importing indeterminism into the scenarios (just as they believe that 
incompatibilists have to control for bypassing intuitions). We believe our findings raise the 
possibility that compatibilists haven’t done their due diligence on this front. In this respect, what 
we’ve done is throw down an empirical gauntlet. If compatibilists don’t like our intrusion items—
which is fine as far as it goes—then they will need to come up with items of their own that will 
succeed where ours purportedly fail. What they can no longer do in the face of our findings is 
ignore the issue altogether and simply assume that people comprehend the implications of 
determinism. 
A second limitation of our study is that it was limited to participants who are in the United 
States. While our online sample was more diverse and representative than usual convenience 
samples drawn from universities, we nevertheless have to avoid making hasty generalizations. 
After all, our online participants are drawn from a country that is Western, Educated, 
Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic (WEIRD: Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010). While there 
are some cross-cultural studies that support natural incompatibilism (Sarkissian et al., 2010; 
Wisniewski, Deutschländer, & Haynes, 2019; cf. Hainnikainen et al., 2019), much work on this 
front remains to be done. In the meantime, it is worth noting that the bulk of the work on folk 
intuitions about free will has been done using WEIRD participants. Given that we were trying to 
respond to and build upon this research, it made sense for us to limit our attention to participants 
in the United States—which reflects the original sample pools that were used by Nahmias et al. 
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(2005; 2006). But we are quick to acknowledge that more cross-cultural work is required before 
we will know whether our findings are robust and stable.  
Despite these two limitations, we believe that we have made a valuable contribution to 
the literature by problematizing two key pieces of evidence that have been used to bolster 
natural compatibilism. When considered against the backdrop of the extant research that 
suggests either that incompatibilism is the default view or that compatibilist intuitions are driven 
by epistemically problematic psychological processes like performance errors, motivated 
cognition, affective bias, intrusion effects, and the like (Clark, Winegard, & Baumeister, 2019; 
Feltz et al., 2009; Feltz & Millan 2013; Nadelhoffer et al., 2014; Nadelhoffer et al., 2019a; 2019b; 
Nichols & Knobe 2007; Rose, 2019; Rose, forthcoming; Rose et al., 2016; Roskies & Nichols, 2008; 
Sarkissian et al., 2010; Wisniewski et al., 2019), our findings further complicate the project of 
compatibilists who want to align their view with common sense. This is not to say that the case 
is closed when it comes to natural compatibilism (see for example Turri, 2017a; 2017b). But if 
natural compatibilists want to defend their view moving forward, they will need to devise a new 
strategy for guaranteeing that when participants read deterministic scenarios their intuitions are 
not inappropriately influenced by an intrusive indeterministic metaphysics.24 
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